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YET ANOTHER MARKET TRANSITION?: MOVING
TOWARDS MARKET-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTAL
SUPPORT OF WIND POWER IN CHINA
ROGER RAUFER, XU LITONG- & WANG SHUJUAN...
1.

INTRODUCTION

China is among the world's richest countries in terms of
absolute, conventional energy resources, especially coal.
Unfortunately, petroleum and natural gas reserves are very modest
compared with those for coal. Coal's share of China's total
primary energy consumption has been decreasing, but it still
represented 67% in 2001.1 The country has adopted an energy
strategy that relies heavily on domestic resources, and its resource
base suggests that coal will therefore continue to be critically
important well into the future.
In 1949, all electric power within the country came under state
ownership and control. Since then China's centralized planning
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2002) (showing that coal use as a percentage of China's total energy consumption
has decreased from 95% in 1952 to 67% in 2001).
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has defined the electric power sector within the country. Under
centralized planning, the government sought to achieve a balance
between electricity supply and demand, allocating resources to
industries, projects, and regions that were deemed deserving of
priority in order to meet national goals. However, the electric
power sector came to epitomize the unfortunate characteristics of
centralized planning: chronic shortages and inefficiency.
China began its quest to adopt market-oriented reforms in the
late 1970s, and shortly thereafter adopted a series of changes aimed
specifically at the electricity sector. The first set of reforms in the
mid-1980s primarily targeted the chronic shortages brought about
by both centralized planning and immediate growth from market
reforms in the overall economy. These reforms allowed others
besides the central government to invest in capacity, and raised
electricity rates to provide capital for expansion.
A second round of reforms was carried out in the 1990s, a time
when China was moving further towards a market-oriented
economy integrated with international capital flows, and began to
address the question of efficiency. China had developed sufficient
generating capacity despite very high economic growth rates, and
even had surplus levels in various regions brought about by the
development of new facilities and the closing of older, inefficient,
state-owned enterprises. This surplus offered an opportunity to
introduce economic dispatch pilot projects and other efficiency
improvements, although it also brought about reluctance to meet
the financial obligations for facilities constructed under shortage
conditions.
A new round of reforms is currently underway. Following the
British approach, the reforms seek to split generation from
transmission and distribution, making it compatible with marketoriented supply. The reforms also seek to move the central
government out of the role of a centralized planner allocating
energy sector resources and into the role of a regulator seeking to
correct market failures.
2.

WIND RESOURCE CONCESSIONS

In the past, China has typically met its increased demands for
electricity by burning more coal, but this has had serious
environmental consequences. The country has abundant wind
resources, and the environmental benefits of utilizing this
renewable resource are likely to be considerable. To spur
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development of wind resources, it has been proposed that the
resources are treated much like oil or natural gas and that Wind
Resource Concessions ("WRC") are established and granted to
2
developers offering the most attractive bidding prices.
Similar to oil and natural gas, wind resources are
geographically constrained energy resources, requiring further
exploration and/or assessment for development. As an energy
resource, wind is more readily accessible than either oil or natural
gas reserves, and the resource assessments are simpler from a
technical viewpoint and much less expensive in economic terms.
Like oil and gas, both on- and off-shore sites are similarly
appropriate for wind development.
However, other important characteristics are starkly different.
Petroleum products are static, storable, fungible commodities sold
in large-scale international markets, while wind power is dynamic,
generates electricity intermittently, and requires localized
consumption. Storage tends to be very expensive for wind power,
and this technology typically produces electricity at a cost well
above competing alternatives- even without considering the cost
of storage technologies. Conceptually, while a WRC approach
might be technically feasible, the question of whether it would
work in economic terms is much more problematic.
3.

THE POLICY SETTING FOR WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT

Wind power has flourished recently in many other countries,
despite its higher price, because of specific government policies
It has been recognized that
encouraging its development.
environmental and other externalities are not fully accounted for in
direct market comparisons of power generating technologies, and
conventional technologies have received -and continue to receive considerable subsidies from governments.
While there are a myriad of forms of government assistance,
the two most significant support policies for the Renewable Energy
Systems ("RES") are those which:

2 See TIMOTHY P. BRENNAND, CONCESSIONS FOR WIND POWER PLANTS: A NEW
APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 6 (2000) (arguing that

issuing concessions or licenses to venture companies to develop prospective areas
with good renewable energy resources and utilizing modified regulatory
mechanisms proven in other industrial sectors such as the petroleum and natural
gas industries could lead to accelerated growth in the availability of development
finance for the renewable energy sector in China).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J.Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 24:3

a. offer price-based support, typically in the form of a feed-in
tariff for the RES electric power; or
b. employ quantity-based "obligations," which mandate that a
certain level of power generated (i:e., 10% or 20%)3 be

provided by RES.
The latter usually allows compliance to be achieved through
the trading of "green certificates" or Renewable Energy Credits
("REC") associated with RES power generation. These price and
quantity support approaches mirror a similar policy debate that
has already occurred within the pollution control arena. This
similarity is not surprising, perhaps, since both pollution control
and renewable energy programs are designed to utilize economic
principles and mechanisms within a regulated market in order to
accomplish environmental goals that would not otherwise occur in
an unregulated setting. Therefore, to see how such a policy
distinction could affect wind power in China, it is worthwhile to
first review the comparable situation for pollution control.
Historically, a regulatory framework has evolved that is very
compatible with the technology-based engineering worldview.
Governments typically set environmental goals in the form of
environmental quality standards to protect society from excessive
pollutant levels. These standards are usually set by analyzing
scientific knowledge about public health impacts, damage to
ecosystems, and so forth.
Such goals are then generally
accomplished by setting technology-oriented standards -such as
emission standards or design standards - that will achieve and
maintain the desired pollutant levels. The linkage between the
environmental goals and the regulatory means is physical modeling,
generally computerized for regulatory purposes.
Economists offer an alternative to this regulatory approach,
however. In their view, governments should set environmental goals
at the point where the marginal cost ("MC") of pollution abatement
equals the marginal benefit ("MB") associated with employing it. All
of the concerns about public health, ecosystem damage, and visibility

3 In the United States, the Senate has passed a bill that includes a similar
requirement for Renewable Energy Systems ("RES"). See S. 14, 108th Cong. (2003)
(requiring that 10% of national electricity supply be provided by RES by 2020); see
also Peter Behr, Senate Breaks Deadlock, Passes 2002 Energy Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
2003, at El (stating that the Senate bill would direct utilities to increase the
amount of electricity generated by wind power and other renewable sources
whereas the House bill does not).
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could theoretically be incorporated into the empirical curves
developed to address the specific environmental problem.
Unlike supply and demand, however, there is no "invisible
hand" that will guide society to the point where marginal cost equals
marginal benefit. Thus, economists have had to address not only the
determination of the environmental goal, but also the regulatory
means to achieve it. Here, they offer two approaches, the first based
on prices and the second based on quantities. The price-based
mechanism was developed by the English economist Arthur Pigou in
his classic text The Economics of Welfare in 1920; therefore pollution
taxes are referred to as Pigouvian taxation.4 The quantity-based
approach was outlined by Professor John Dales of the University of
Toronto in 1968, in his book entitled Pollution, Property and Prices.5
These price and quantity mechanisms are really different sides of the
same coin from an economic efficiency perspective, but important
differences exist in their application, particularly within the political
arena. The resulting pollution control approaches are summarized in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Engineeringv. Economic Worldviews for Pollution Control

Engineering

Economics

Goals:
Regulatory Means:

i

Emission Stds.
Performance Stds.
Opudtr ds.

Pollution Taxes
(Price-based)

PollutionMarkets
(Quantity-based)

Pigouvian Taxation

Emissions Trading

s.

Design Stds

4 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 189-97 (1920)
(discussing the use of taxation to compensate for negative externalities).
5 See JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTON, PROPERTY & PRICES 107 (1968) (discussing how
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Two important transitions are now occurring within the
pollution control regulatory arena on a worldwide basis:
1. there is increasingly a shift from the engineering to the
economic worldview in the adoption of regulatory means;
and
2. there is also an important shift from price-based towards
quantity-based mechanisms within the economic regulatory
means.
3.1. Engineering to Economics Shift
This transition can be viewed as part of a broader, worldwide
the
limits
of
governmental
movement
recognizing
"command/control" mechanisms, and the power of market-oriented
systems. 6 Economic thinking is now becoming evident over a broad
range of environmental topics 7 and its influence is increasing.
In the United States, this has been accomplished in a number of
steps, and it is most evident in the air pollution control regulatory
arena. In the mid-1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") adopted the Emissions Trading Program, which grafted an
economic mechanism allowing marginal cost thinking onto the
traditional engineering-oriented regulatory system. Then in 1990,
Congress adopted Dales' quantity-based approach 8 to control the
acid rain caused by the total loading of sulfur dioxide from electric
utilities. In the late 1990s, the same quantity-based mechanism was
employed to tackle the problem of tropospheric ozone, through the
NOx Budget and similar city and regional environmental markets. 9
This transition has made it clear that the strength of the economic
mechanisms lies in the regulatory means for accomplishing pollution
reductions, rather than the goal-setting process of making the
transferable property rights could be established for waste disposal).
6

See

DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE

BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE

9-17 (1998) (discussing the global move toward market
economies).
7 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy, 39
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 375, 375 (2000) (explaining the use of incentive-based
mechanisms and analytical tools in environmental regulation).
8 See supratext accompanying notes 4-5.
9 For a discussion of this transition, see ROGER K. RAUFER, POLLUTION
MODERN WORLD

MARKETS IN A GREEN COUNTRY TOWN: URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN

183-91 (1998) (discussing quantity-based approaches to environmental
problems such as acid rain and ozone control).
TRANSITION
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marginal cost equal to the marginal benefit. Developing the
marginal benefit curve is fraught with methodological problems, and
as economists move farther away from "use" values and into "nonuse" terrain, such as sympathy for other species or bequests to future
generations, their tools become increasingly less convincing.
However, if their goal-setting approach is contentious, the power of
the regulatory means they offer is more readily evident:
a. they allow the government to focus on setting environmental
targets, rather than dictating stack-by-stack means;
b. they are economically efficient;
c. this efficiency can in turn influence "real world" goal-setting,
allowing governments to be more aggressive in pursuing
environmental protection; and
d. pollution always bears a cost, leading polluters to
continuously seek means for reducing it.
These powerful properties have led to a shift whereby
economic regulatory means are increasingly being used instead of
technology-oriented standards to accomplish the environmental
quality standard goals in Figure 1.10
3.2. Price to Quantity Shift
When applying such economic regulatory means for pollution
control, most countries around the world have tended to favor the
price-based Pigouvian approach, since tax collection is viewed as a
normal, daily administrative function of government. The sizable
revenue collected from pollution taxes also has advantages, such as
providing funding for governments' environmental agencies and for
pollution control technologies. The political implications of this
wealth transfer have often led to proposals for tax/rebate and
tax/subsidy arrangements, which would keep the economic
approach revenue-neutral (e.g., by reducing income or other taxes).
However, the price-based approach has historically been the
mechanism of choice.
The United States has never displayed much political support for
such tax-oriented pricing mechanisms, and the pollution control
economic reforms discussed above followed the quantity-based
approach. The quantity-based approach tends to be more closely
attuned to the American political characteristics of property rights,
markets, and minimizing wealth transfers to the public sector.
10 See supra Figure 1.
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In July 1996, at the Second Session of the Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change ("COP 2") in Geneva, the United States surprised many
global warming activists by calling for "realistic, verifiable, and
binding" targets for greenhouse gas control and laying out a
market-based approach that called for an "international trading
regime.""
The following year, at the Third Session of the
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ("COP 3") in Kyoto, the Kyoto
Protocol was signed, establishing binding constraints on
greenhouse gas emissions and utilizing three quantity-based
"flexibility mechanisms" to reduce costs associated with such
controls.12
Today, many of the former price-based European countries
have become enthusiastic supporters of the Kyoto Protocol's
quantity-based approach. The European Union plans to introduce
a carbon-trading scheme in 2005, and individual European
13
countries have already adopted emissions trading programs.
Other countries are closely studying the idea. Thus, currently,
there is a nascent shift from price to quantity mechanisms within

11See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change at 48, FCCC/CP/1996/15 (1996)
(" [W~e believe the inclusion of activities implemented jointly on a global basis,
and international emissions trading must be part of any future regime."), at
http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/cop2/15.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
12 The three flexibility mechanisms are Joint Implementation under Article 6,
the Clean Development Mechanism under Article 12, and International Emissions
Trading under Article 17. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, art. 6, at 7 (discussing the transfer
or acquisition of emission reduction units), at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs
/convkp/kpeng.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2004); see also id. art. 12, at 12 (defining
the Clean Development Mechanism and stating that its purpose is to assist parties
not included in the Protocol to achieve sustainable development and to allow
those countries that are included to attain compliance with their certified emission
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3); id. art. 17, at 16 (allowing
parties included in Annex B to engage in emissions trading for the purposes of
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3).
13 See, e.g., Danish Energy Authority, C02 Cap and Trade for Electricity
Production (July 15, 2000) (explaining that Denmark launched a power sector
Emissions
Trading
("ET")
program
in
July
2000),
at
http://www.ens.dk/sw085.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2003); U.K. Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, U.K. Emissions TradingScheme (Sept. 8, 2003)
(stating that the United Kingdom launched an ET program in April 2002), at
http://wwwdefra.gov.uk/environment/climate change/trading/index.htm.
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the pollution control regulatory arena, following the lead of the
United States.
3.3. Economic Mechanismsfor Renewable Energy Support
The debate about support systems for renewable energy has a
similar framework, and the same actors have taken similar initial
positions. However, the comparable price-to-quantity transition
for RES support has not been proceeding as smoothly as the
transition for pollution control.
About three quarters of the world's current wind power
generating capacity is in Europe, and 84% of that is found in just
three countries: Germany, Denmark, and Spain.14 Not surprisingly,
these three countries have had powerful price supports designed to
encourage wind development. With these high price-level supports,
the market responded with dramatic increases in wind power
capacity and all three countries were also able to develop strong
wind turbine manufacturing capabilities.'i Wind developers and the
environmental community obviously have hailed such development.
However, the downside to this approach is that such price supports
can be extremely costly. 16 They are also contrary to the idea of the
European Union's liberalized market-oriented approach to energy
systems.
The quantity-based approach, on the other hand, typically relies
on an "obligation" to use RES. This is usually mandated by the
government in the form of a Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS").
The trading of "green certificates" or renewable energy credits
associated with RES can help achieve that RIPS in 'an economically
efficient manner. As shown in Figure 2, these markets are similar to
the emissions trading markets, albeit in inverse form-instead of
14 See Press Release, European Wind Energy Association, European Wind
Energy Achieves 40% Growth Rate (Nov. 13, 2002) ("Europe's installed wind energy
capacity reached 20,447 megawatts ("MW"), 74 per cent of the world total .... A
total of 84 per cent of European wind energy is installed in Germany, Spain, and
Denmark."), availableat http://www.ewea.org/doc/13-11-02%20European%20
wind%20energy%20achives%2040%25%20growth%20rate.pdf (last visited Sept.

24, 2003).
See id. ("About 80 [%] of all wind turbines sold worldwide are
manufactured by European companies.").
16 See Philippe Menanteau et al., Prices Versus Quantities: Choosing Policies for
Promoting the Development of Renewable Energy, 31 ENERGY POL'Y 799, 807 (2003)
(explaining that supporting renewable energy has "proved very costly in terms of
subsidies, either for clients of electricity utilities, or for the state budget").
15
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trying to reduce the quantity of pollution, the government seeks to
increase the quantity of RES.17 Both of them are artificial markets, in
which demand has been created by governmental fiat.
Figure2: Market-based Pollution Control v. RES Support

Emissions Trading

Pollution levels

Renewable Energy Credit
(REC) Trading

-

-_

_

RES levels

Zero base

These types of quantity-based systems have been employed
successfully by individual states within the United States.' 8 For
example, the state of Texas added 915 megawatts ("MW") of wind
power in 2001, more than the total amount added within the whole
country in any previous year.19 However, the RPS systems typically
17 There are also important differences.
See Marc W. Chupka, Designing
Effective Renewable Markets, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 46, 47-48 (May 2003) ("The overall

market for .

.

. [Renewable Energy

Credits ("REC"s)] is defined very

differently ....Emission allowances and RECs are created very differently ....
Market participants can make various short-term adjustments to changes in EA
prices, but cannot adjust quickly to RES price changes.").
18 See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (listing U.S.
states with a Renewable Portfolio Standard), at http://www.dsireusa.org
/library/includes/type.cfm?Type=RPS&Back=regtab&CurrentPagelD=7&Search
=TableType (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
19 See Press Release, American Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy Grew
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require a sophisticated institutional structure to achieve such
success. 20
Recognizing that price supports were costing the country
considerable sums, Denmark decided to make the transition from
price-based support to a green certificate quantity-based market
program in 1999. Not surprisingly, however, the wind power
industry was fiercely opposed to such a shift, and was ultimately
able to convince the government that the quantity-based scheme
was impractical; the scheme was subsequently placed on indefinite
hold. The Swedish government proposed a similar shift, and met
similar resistance. Industry groups in both countries recognized
that such a trading scheme might ultimately be appropriate, but
suggested that it take place under the harmonized E.U. system,
rather than on a country-by-country basis. However, it has been
suggested that such a harmonized effort is not likely to be
implemented before 2010.21
Other pan-European groups -for example, the Renewable
Electricity Certificate Trading project ("RECerT") 22 and the
Renewable Energy Certificate System ("RECS")23- have suggested
Globally at Record Clip in 2001, Report Finds (Mar. 19, 2002) ("Of the new wind
power capacity installed last year, nearly 1,700 MW were from wind farms built
across the United States, including more new wind capacity in a single state,
Texas (915 MW) than had ever been installed before in the entire country in a
single year."), at http://www.awea.org/news/news20319glo.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003).
20 RYAN WISER & OLE LANGNISS, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., THE

RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD INTEXAS: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 14 (Nov. 2001)
(discussing how the success of the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS")
can be attributed to "several positive design and implementation features of the
policy"), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/49107.pdf (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003).
21 See Soren Krohn, Wind Energy Policy in Denmark: Status 2002 (commenting
that the E.U. Directive on Electricity from the renewable energy believes Denmark
will not implement renewables until 2010), at http://www.windpower.org/en
/articles/energypo.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
22 This project, a real-time internet-enabled trading platform, had more than
140 participants from 27 partners in 16 countries. See ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, LTD., THE EUROPEAN RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY CERTIFICATE TRADING

PROJECTS: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 5 (2001) (concluding that quantity-based
mechanism was "more cost-efficient and effective" than a price-based feed-in
tariff system), available at http://recert.energyprojects.net/documents/RECerTFinalTechnicalReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
23 See Renewable Energy Certificate System, History of the RECS Group
(explaining that the Renewable Energy Certificate System ("RECS") is an
industry-led, independent initiative launched in 1999 whose goal is to promote
international trade in renewable energy certificates), at http://www.recs.org (last
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that the quantity-based approach is the most appropriate means of
increasing RES in Europe. Although the transition from price to
quantity mechanisms for renewable energy has not been occurring
as smoothly as that for pollution control, it nonetheless seems
likely that such quantity-based programs will evolve over time and
over a larger market base.
4.

RES SUPPORT IN CHINA

Like most countries, China has traditionally relied on priceoriented systems, and has virtually no experience with quantitybased systems for either pollution control or RES. In the late 1970s,
China, like the United States, modified its pollution control
engineering approach, adopting a Pollution Levy System ("PLS")
designed to target those emission sources not in compliance with
regulations. The PLS collected a fee based on each kilogram of
pollution emitted that surpassed the level targeted by the
technological requirements. While not a full-fledged Pigouvian tax
(since it applies only to excess emissions), the system can also be
viewed as an incremental efficiency movement, laying the
groundwork for a priced-based economic approach. There have
been various attempts to revise the PLS throughout the years, 24
including recent attempts that would bring it closer to the
25
economic ideal of Pigouvian taxation.
China has also begun to explore the application of quantitybased pollution control mechanisms, 26 but there are obvious
institutional concerns- including "rule of law" compliance
problems, the uncertain status of property rights within the
visited Sept. 6, 2003).
24 See Roger K. Raufer, Economic Tools in Air Pollution Abatement: The
Increasing Role of Quantity-Based Mechanisms, Address at the International
Conference on Engineering and Technological Sciences 2000 11 (Oct. 2000) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law) (noting
that China has taken preliminary steps towards applying quantity-based
mechanisms for pollution control).
25 See China Introduces Changes in PollutantEmission Charges, CENEwS, Jan. 27,
2003 (reporting a change to the Pollution Levy System), at http://www.cenews.
com.cn/english/2003-01-27/223.php; see also Robert A. Bohm et al., Environmental
Taxes: China's Bold Initiative, ENv'T, Sept. 1998, at 33 (describing the major
provisions of Pollution Levy System ("PLS") reform in China).
26 For an example of China's exploration of quantity-based pollution control,

see P. N. FERNANDO

ET AL., ASIAN DEV. BANK, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE ENERGY

100-09 app. C (1999)
(outlining ten examples of emissions trading schemes in China).

SECTOR: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss3/1

2003]

WIND POWER IN CHINA

589

country, and unfamiliarity with artificial market systems created
solely by the government.
In the renewable energy area, the country has leaned towards
the price side, requiring utilities to purchase wind power
generated by individual projects and paying the higher generation
costs associated with this technology. There is no national feed-in
tariff, but rather there is support through site-specific power
purchase agreements ("PPA"), which then spread the additional
support costs across the nearby grid. Unfortunately, this rule has
not been enforced, 27 and both PPA compliance?8 and grid costspreading 29 have proved problematic.
China's Tenth Five-Year Plan included a quantity-based
proposal, but the Plan has not yet been able to garner significant
political support, given both the uncertainty about the ongoing
electric power restructuring and the recognition that it would
result in higher costs. The country is, however, proceeding with
the WRC mechanism, which is designed to bring market-oriented
thinking to wind power development.
In a pioneering study in 2000, Timothy Brennand of the
University of East Anglia in Great Britain proposed treating wind
resources in China much like oil and natural gas, and offering
concessions on large tracts of land for wind power development.
Developers would bid for the right to develop wind power within
these tracts, and could then site 500 MW or even 1000 MW of wind

27 See ZHENGMIN ZHANG ET AL., THE CHINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY PROGRAM,
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: THE POTENTIAL AND THE CHALLENGES

77 (describing the potential benefits of renewable energy sources in China along
with the challenges faced in implementing them), available at http://www.
efchina.org/documents/China.REReportEN.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
28 See, e.g., China Electricity Reform Will Reassure Foreign Investors, POWER
ENGINEERING INT'L, Mar. 11, 2002 (explaining that the owners of Meizhou Wan -a
725 MW coal-fired power plant built in Fujian province-held a twenty-year
power purchase agreement ("PPA") with the Fujian Provincial Electric Power
Bureau; however, the province apparently backed away from the PPA when the
facility was completed because there was no longer a power shortage in that area),
at http://pepei.pennnet.com/Articles/ArticleDisplay.cfm?Section=Archives&
Subsection=Display&ARTICLEID=138147&KEYWORD=Meizhou%2OWan.
29 See, e.g., Memorandum from Yoshihiko Sumi of the World Bank on
Restructuring the China Renewable Energy Development Project, 11-12 (May 1,
2001) (explaining that a World Bank/Global Environment Facility loan was
restructured in 2001, and that wind power generating capacity dropped from 190
MW to 20 MW because of difficulty in obtaining agreement on cost-sharing of the
higher wind power costs), at http://gefweb.org/Documents /ProjectProposals_
for_Endorsem/PP Archives/ChinaRenewableEnergy.pdf.
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power within them, depending upon the wind resource
characteristics, the economic viability of projects, and the
concession terms established.30
Based upon Brennand's work and a number of other studies,
the State Development Planning Commission ("SDPC") -now
known as the National Development and Reform Commission
("NDRC")-issued draft guidelines for WRC pilot projects 3' in
November 2001, and then held a WRC workshop in Guangdong
that same month. 32 More than a hundred people attended the
workshop, including governmental officials, private sector
developers,
consultants,
multilateral
non-governmental
organizations, and local power officials. The draft document
indicated the following: it was applicable to wind projects greater
than 50 MW; the concession period would last for twenty years;
and the selection would be made through a tender open to both
domestic and international investors. The draft document further
suggested that the dominant criterion in the tender evaluation was
the power tariff; however, it also indicated that the equipment
purchasing plan, the financing plan, and the construction plan
would all be taken into account. It also noted that there would be
requirements for local production, and that "purchasing
equipment with a high local production rate would result in a high
score in the evaluation." 33
After the workshop, Guangdong and Jiangsu projects were
chosen as pilot projects for the WRC. Their provincial planning
commissions prepared proposals, which were submitted to the
SDPC for approval. In December 2002, the SDPC issued its
approval documents for the two projects. These documents were
only applicable to the two individual projects, and therefore did
not constitute a final issuance of the WRC guidelines. However,
See BRENNAND, supra note 2, at 8 (outlining an approach to sustainable
energy development).
31 See generally State Development Planning Commission, Administration
Procedures on Wind Power Concession Pilot Project (P.R.C.) (Nov. 22, 2001)
(unpublished draft, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law) (outlining procedures to enhance the economics of
wind power through increased capacities and competition).
32 See Roger K. Raufer & Shujuan Wang, Wind Resource Concession Approach in
China, 22 IEEE POWER ENGINEERING REv. 9, 14 (2002) ("The State Development
Planning Commission (SDPC) held a 2-day workshop on wind power concessions
in November 2001 in Guangzhou ....).
33 State Development Planning Commission, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining
the steps toward developing a wind power concession project).
30
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some changes were made to the originally drafted material,
including a doubling of project size from 50 MW to 100 MW, and
an extension of the concession period from twenty years to twentyfive years. The approval documents also specified that the
generator units must be larger than 600 kilowatts. The concession
offers were made in April 2003 for both projects, and the final bids
were due in September, 2003. Panels then have one month to
evaluate these bids, and the concessions are scheduled to be
granted at the conclusion of this evaluation period.
Brennand has not addressed the more narrowly defined
tendering type of WRC arrangement, but that type of WRC
arrangement still faces the problem that wind power is not
competitive with alternatives and therefore requires governmental
support. One might view this type of concession itself as
providing "support," albeit on a very small scale. For example,
one might say that by providing a concession for certain numbers
of hours of operation of a 50 or 100 megawatt facility, authorities
are essentially providing an "obligation" or "quota" for a set
amount of power, much like a quantity-based support system.
Alternatively, one might hold that by agreeing to purchase
electricity generated from the facility at a bidding price higher than
prospective alternatives, authorities are providing a form of price
support. Neither viewpoint provides all of the characteristics
normally associated with such support programs, but
governmental support is nonetheless provided.
If such narrow "concessions" were prolifically employed in
China, then the need for a national quantity- or price-based wind
development program would disappear. The country would
essentially have a tendering policy for wind power development.
Such tendering arrangements introduce competition, and thus
increase efficiency. However, historically they have not done
much to foster domestic wind power development, and they can
be subject to manipulation by established market players. 34 On the
other hand, if China developed a strong national quantity- or pricebased development program, then the need for the WRC itself
would obviously diminish. The support program itself could
theoretically take care of market development.
34 See Ryan Wiser et al., Renewable Energy Policy Options for China: A
Comparison of Renewable Portfolio Standards, Feed-in Tariffs, and Tendering Policies,
STUDY OF MAJOR INT'L ENERGY POLICIES 17, 34-35 (2002) (comparing different policy
options for renewable energy).
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The Brennand and SDPC approaches are not the sole types of
wind concessions that might be offered, and one might envision a
range of concession "packages" that offer privileged access to land,
wind resources, transmission capacity, electricity sales, regulatory
pricing priority, or various other factors of interest to project
developers. Nor are WRC arrangements the sole means of
building wind power projects within China. The Government
made clear at the 2001 WRC conference that wind projects could
also be built utilizing the same procedures as any other power
project (i.e., coal, natural gas, hydropower, and so on.).
The broader Brennand approach (i.e., providing privileged
access to large tracts of land for wind power development, which
leads to private sector development of large-scale wind units
backed by international financing and thereby lowers the costs
necessary to make this renewable resource economically
competitive) cannot be employed today in China because the
approach is not economically or institutionally viable. But over
time such a Brennand-style WRC approach could co-evolve with
an appropriate governmental support system.
5.

A PROPOSED POLICY APPROACH FOR WIND POWER
DEVELOPMENT

0

China is currently undergoing significant change on several
fronts. The country is shifting from a centrally planned economy
to a "socialist market economy" and recently agreed to abide by
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") requirements, further
opening its economy to international trade. It recently transferred
political power within the top echelons of the Communist Party,
and reorganized several significant governmental entities such as
the SDPC and the State Economic and Trade Commission
("SETC"). China is also restructuring its entire power system,
separating electricity generation from transmission and
distribution, and moving the system towards price-based
dispatching rather than administrative load directives. All of these
changes have an impact on wind power development.
While the country has implemented a series of previous policy
measures designed to support wind power, 35 the ultimate levels
35 See Zhang et al., supra note 27, at app. A (listing policies, laws, and
regulations associated with renewable energy in China). The policy measures
include: the former Ministry of Power Industry's regulations regarding
connection and operation of wind power grids from 1994 (which stipulated that
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achieved have been far below expectations and far below the levels
reached by other developing countries (e.g., 460 MW in China
versus more than 1700 MW in India). Institutional considerations
have often been blamed for this slow development, 36 and the
"balkanized," non-coordinated (and sometimes competing) efforts
of various governmental entities have led to considerable
frustration for developers.
With past institutional organization a problem, and
considerable ongoing institutional change, it is apparent that
China's efforts to develop wind power need to be addressed in a
long term, transitional framework. In a comprehensive study,37 the

Authors have proposed a relatively measured, "learn-as-you-go"
policy approach summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: ProposedPolicy Transitionfor Wind Power Development in
China38
2003-2007

2008-2014

Post 2015

Capacity

Market

RES Markets

Development
Develop wind
industry

Government
Priority
I

Development
Provide costRegulatory
effective wind power
support for full
I scale RES markets
I_

grids should allow wind farms to connect near the project site and should
purchase the project's total generation output); the State Development Planning
Commission's "Ride the Wind" program from 1996 (which was designed to draw
foreign investment through joint ventures and to foster the development of new
turbine technology); and the Ministry of Science and Technology's special budgets
for renewable energy prioritized projects (which have supported wind power
research and development since 1995).
36 See, e.g., Lin Gan, Wind Energy Development and Dissemination in China:
Prospects and Constraints in an Institutional Context, 2 SINOSPHERE 22, 27-28 (2002)
(noting investment loans, tax systems, electricity prices, technology transfer and
human resources as institutional barriers to wind energy development), at
http://www.chinaenvironment.net/sino/sino4.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2003);
Wen-Qiang Liu & Xi-Liang Zhang, Cost Competitive Incentives for Wind Energy
Development in China: Institutional Dynamics and Policy Changes, 30 ENERGY POL'Y
753, 757-61 (2002) (identifying pricing regulation, tariff policy, and high initial
investment cost as institutional barriers to wind power development).
37 See Roger K. Raufer et al., Steps Towards a Wind Resource Concession Approach
in China, U.N. Development Programme, Division for Sustainable Development,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, at 75, U.N. Doc. CPR/97/005 (2003)
(advising China to adopt a "price-based support program in its early stages" and
"move towards the more market-oriented quantity approach... in a later time
period.").
38 Id. tbl. 7.1, at 79.
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Small (<40 MW)

Larger (40-150 MW)

Large (>100 MW)

Narrowly defined,
site-specific
project
development
rights
Extensive
National Program

Broader, with
assessment risks
taken on by bidders

Large scale tracts

Shift towards
Provincial
Governments
- Participation in
CDM
- Provincial level
experimentation
with RPS (with REC
trading)

Lesser role

- Participation in
CDM

- Participation in
CDM
- Further
development of
RPS (as needed)
with REC trading

The table suggests that China should initially adopt a pricebased support program in its early stages (2003-2007), fostering
There should be
industrial development in wind energy.
projects
designed
to "prime the
numerous relatively small-scale
pump" for the industry and to provide cost-effective wind power.
These small-scale projects will give the country time to build up its
institutional infrastructure in this area.
The second phase (2008-2014) would move towards larger-scale
projects, more rigorously sited. The emphasis would begin to shift
from institution building towards more cost-effective power
delivery. More risks would be shifted towards the concessionaire,
and in the latter stages, the government would begin to move more
towards a market-oriented quantity approach, beginning RPS-type
pilot projects in individual provinces or regions.
In the post-2015 period, after both the industrial and
institutional frameworks have been developed and China has
tapped into the experience of both European and U.S. marketbased approaches, it would move towards a fully market-oriented
system-a system consistent with the rules and modalities of the
Clean Development Mechanism and other international
environmental markets.
Two other salient features of such a transition are also
important: a) the support scheme should be national in scope with
a commitment to wean the nascent wind industry from donor and
multilateral agency funding support; and b) the nature of the
concessions granted must change over time, beginning with
narrow "project development rights" in the initial phase, and
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moving toward large-scale concession tracts similar to oil and
natural gas concessions after 2015. These narrowly defined
concessions in the initial stage might not be very different from the
tendering type concessions currently proposed by the Chinese
government, but the emphasis of the WRC program would change.
The current emphasis is on large-scale, cost-effective power
delivery, while this report suggests that institution-building,
broader market experience, RES manufacturing development, and
stronger governmental support - both economic and legal - for
independent developers is more important in early stages.
6.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE

WRC
Europe and America have shown that it is possible to utilize
governmental supports (whether price or quantity) to establish a
significant market for wind power. This has led to significant
technological cost decreases. China's view of the WRC seems to
emphasize cost reduction as the principal goal, with the hope that a
viable market will develop accordingly. It aims to encourage
increasingly large wind farms and units, and thereby attract
private sector financing. However, the regulatory, independent
development, and manufacturing infrastructures required to
support such cost reductions are not currently in place.
Given such a situation, the WRC program should instead
proceed in the following manner:
* The WRC needs an institutional "champion," and such an
organizational entity should have as its fundamental
purpose the promotion of wind power generation within
the electricity sector. Its tasks might include: ensuring that
existing regulations which foster the use of wind power are
enforced; developing new regulations to foster its
utilization; and developing standardized power purchase
agreements, concession contracts, bidding materials, and
similar documents for wind utilization.
* Governmental targets for wind power development should
allow an initial capacity development stage, with more
aggressive growth in later years, as the markets and
institutional infrastructure develop. Appropriate wind
generation target levels might be as follows: 1 gigawatt
("GW") by 2005; 10 GW by 2010; 20 GW by 2015.
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* While cost efficiencies depend upon large-scale turbines
and project sizes, China's near-term needs are more
oriented towards RES market development within the
power sector. Thus, the development of numerous smaller
scale projects in a wide range of settings and from a diverse
number of developers should be encouraged. No project
thresholds are necessary in WRC guidance.
* There must be an attempt to minimize risks for developers
at this stage of development. Supporting numerous small
wind farms could help to minimize the financial risks
associated with any individual project. At this stage, the
uncertainty of the PPA arrangements in the existing WRC
program needs to be overcome, and guarantees for
financial protection must rest with the national
government, not the grid company or the province.
Recognizing the burden that this imposes on the
government, a system benefit charge or comparable
mechanism could serve to help garner funds for such
purposes.
* The wind resource assessment is critical for the WRC, and
should be pursued through three different strategies during
the three stages of wind power development noted above.
In the first stage, developers would rely on governmentsupported data collection; as in existing pilot projects,
however, a pricing mechanism could be used to
compensate for resource data uncertainty. In stage two, an
organization employing internationally accepted standards
could collect the data, but would not be allowed to take
part in the bidding. In stage three, wind developers would
be independently responsible for all resource assessments.
" Aside from general guidelines designed to ensure
compatible bids, grid connection issues are a bilateral
technical concern and can be addressed within the PPA
arrangements, rather than within the WRC framework.
" The government obviously has an interest in furthering the
manufacture of larger-scale turbines within China, but this
should not be a "blanket" policy applicable to all WRC
projects.
" A variety of other factors affect implementation of the
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WRC, including the time period needed for approvals (for
example, tariffs and local land use); penalty periods; the
role of governmental agents in the bidding process; the
measurement of "local content"; and project selection
criteria. Most of these factors are not unique to wind
projects, but will be found in virtually any power sector
development project. The key point for implementation of
the WRC in its early stages is to try to minimize uncertainty
and risk for project developers.
As developers and
governmental authorities gain confidence in the WRC
process, the larger-scale, market-driven opportunities will
develop over time.
7.

CONCLUSION

Wind power development needs governmental support. China
has introduced a wind resource concession approach that is
designed to move wind power development towards a market
orientation, but this does not obviate the need for government
support. Both price and quantity mechanisms could be employed
to provide such support.
European countries have traditionally employed price-based
economic systems for both renewable energy system support and
pollution control, but many are now beginning to move towards
quantity-based approaches in both areas. The pollution control
transition for greenhouse gas control is proceeding smoothly,
although the transition for renewable energy system support has
not yet been as successful. The United States has successfully
adopted quantity-based approaches in both pollution control and
RES areas, but has found that institutional considerations play a
critical role.
China has some price-based system experience in both areas,
but virtually no experience in quantity-based approaches. Given
the considerable levels of change occurring in the country and
previous institutional problems associated with wind power
development, it is proposed that a longer term transitional policy
framework be adopted. This would move China from price-to
quantity-based support approaches over more than a decade-long
period. Such a program would allow China to build on its
previous experience; to learn from both U.S. and European efforts
to develop such market-based approaches; to be consistent with
Kyoto Protocol and Clean Development Mechanism efforts; to
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develop a domestic manufacturing capability; and, as wind power
becomes, competitive with conventional power generating
technologies, to be fully consistent with other market-oriented
programs such as the wind resource concession approach.
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